

Web Attacks and How to Stop Them

John Rogers Senior Application Security Engineer Lincoln Financial Group

Objectives

>Overview

- Threats
- Vulnerabilities
- Remediation
- Education & Awareness

Invite Discussion

Please ask questions
 Short ones during
 Long ones after

card

Always Get Written Permission!

Information, programs, and techniques contained in this presentation should not be used on corporate equipment or systems unless you have <u>explicit written</u> <u>permission</u> of the system owner, your management team and your Information Security department.

There are cases of well intentioned individuals having their <u>employment terminated</u> because they utilized penetration tools or techniques on company hardware or systems without written permission.

Introduction

John Rogers (JR) > Senior Application Security Engineer

- Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP)
- InfraGard Nebraska Board Member
- >Application and User Interface developer
- Email: John.Rogers@lfg.com

Outline

Web Application Threats

Web Application Vulnerabilities

> Remediation Techniques

> > OWASP

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Checkpoint

Web Application Threats

Web Application Vulnerabilities

> Remediation Techniques

> > OWASP

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The Top Cyber Security Risks
 SANS Report - September 2009
 http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/

>60% of all Internet attacks

>80% of the vulnerabilities being discovered

Cross-Site Scripting

SQL Injection

- Immature Security Awareness
- In-House Development
- Deceptive Simplicity
- Rapidly Evolving Threat Profile
- Resource and Time Constraints
- Overextended Technologies

Users can submit Arbitrary Input!
 Never, ever, trust the client, no control.

- Users can interfere with any piece of data transmitted.
- Client side validation is considered a vulnerability.
- Don't Trust Client Demo.



Don't Trust Client Demo


Firefox

Burp Suite

Integrated platform for analyzing web applications.

Intercepting Proxy, Spider, Decoder, etc.

Combine manual and automated techniques to enumerate, analyze, attack and exploit web applications.



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Don't Trust the Client Demo

VRL: http://demo.testfire.net

Sign In
 Username: jsmith
 Password: Demo1234

Modify Account Details
 Add Select element





Don't Trust the Client Demo

PERSONAL

SMALL BUSINESS

G0

Hello John Smith

Welcome to Altoro Mutual Online.

View Account Details:


Congratulations!

1001160140 Checking ✓ 1001160140 Checking 1001160141 Savings 1001160141 Savings JR Hacked This

You have been pre-approved for an Altoro Gold Visa with a credit limit of \$10000!

Click Here to apply.

Outline



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Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

SQL Injection

Malicious File Execution

Top Web Application Attacks 2008/2009

Firewall

- False sense of security
- Firewall = No Application Security
- Port 80/443 are wide open
- Firewall only = "Crunchy Outside, Soft Chewy Inside"



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 OWASP Rank/Description
 #1 on OWASP Top Ten

Attack against the client (initially)

Application does not first validate data sent from client.

Allows attackers to execute script in the victim's browser.





An attacker finds an XSS hole in a web application

The attacker creates an attack URL for stealing sensitive information and disguises it so that it appears legitimate

> When the victim logs in, Javascript embedded with the malicious XSS link executes and transmits the victim's login information to the attacker.

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The attacker distributes the malicious XSS link via social engineering to unsuspecting users

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Types
 - Reflective
 - Stored
 - DOM Injection
- Demo

AltoroMutual Search – Reflective XSS
 WebGoat XSS Lesson – Stored XSS

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Demo – AltoroMutual Search – Reflective XSS >http://demo.testfire.net

Unauthenticated vulnerability

Test<script>alert('hi mom');</script> <iframe src=http://ha.ckers.org/scriptlet.html <</p>

RSnake XSS Cheatsheet

http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Demo – AltoroMutual Search – Reflective XSS

PERSONAL

SMALL BUSINESS

Search Results

No results were found (The page at http://demo.testfire.net says:	×
Test	hi mom	
	ОК	

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Demo – WebGoat XSS Lesson – Stored XSS
 Start WebGoat – WebGoat 5.3
 http://127.0.0.1:8080/webgoat/attack
 user = guest, password = guest
 Restart XSS Lesson

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Demo – WebGoat XSS Lesson – Stored XSS

Logout

OWASP WebGoat V5.2	- Hints > Show Params Show Cookies Lesson Plan Show Java Solution
ntroduction	Solution Videos Restart this Less
General	Stage 2: Block Stored XSS using Input Validation.
Access Control Flaws	THIS LESSON ONLY WORKS WITH THE DEVELOPER VERSION OF WEBGOAT
AJAX Security	Implement a fix to block the stored XSS before it can be write as 'Eric' with 'David' as the manager. Verify that 'David' is no Windows Internet Explorer
uthentication Flaws	* You have completed Stored XSS. * Welcome to Block Stored XSS using Input Validation hi mom
uffer Overflows	
ode Quality	Goat Hills Financia
Concurrency	Human Resources
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	iii Welcome Back Jerry
enial of Service	· ····

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Attack Vectors
 - Steal Cookies
 - Key Logging
 - Port Scanning internal network
 - Steal Clipboard contents
 - Browser Exploits
 - Redirect to other malicious content
 - Age of JavaScript attacks
 - >JINX JavaScript Malware Framework
 - Browser Exploitation Framework (BeEF)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Defenses Input Validation
 Use Standard input validation mechanism.
 - Validate all input data for length, type, syntax, and business rules before trusting data.

 1001160140 Checking
 Image: Control of the second secon

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Defenses – Input Validation.
 OWASP Input Validation Strategies
 Accept Known Good

Reject Known Bad

Sanitize

No Action – Best way to make the news.

Maybe a combination of first three.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Defenses Output Encoding
 - Ensure that all user-supplied data is appropriately entity encoded (either HTML or XML depending on the output mechanism) before rendering to client.

"<" and ">" = "<" and ">"

Specify the output encoding (such as ISO 8859-1 or UTF 8). Do not allow the attacker to choose this for your users.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

- Defenses Issues
 - Use Input Validation and Output Encoding together.

Don't allow hostile content to live in DB.

Perform Input Validation Close to "Front Door"

Need to handle error processing.

Blend Input Validation Strategies Accept Known Good for everything but free form text fields. Use Reject Known Bad these fields.

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SQL Injection

OWASP Rank/Description
 #2 OWASP Top Ten

Attack against server

Common vulnerability

Occurs when user-supplied data is sent to an command/query interpreter.

Hostile data tricks the interpreter into executing unintended commands.

SQL Injection

Demo – AltoroMutual Authentication Bypass
 Bypass Authentication
 Single Quote Test
 Talk directly to Interpreter
 Lots of Information Leakage
 Yum!

SQL Injection

Demo – AltoroMutual Authentication Bypass Information Leakage



SQL Injection

Demo – AltoroMutual Authentication Bypass
 Bypass Authentication
 Exploit Steps
 Username: admin
 Password: abc' or 1=1;- Result: Hello Admin User



SQL Injection

Demo – AltoroMutual Authentication Bypass


📄 Altoro Mutual: Online Banking Home 🛛 🔸					
Altoro Mutual			Sign Off Contact Us Fe	edback Search	Go DEMO SITE ONLY
	PERSONAL	SMALL BUSINESS		INSIDE ALTORO MUTUAL	
I WANT TO View Account Summary View Recent Transactions Transfer Funds Search News Articles Customize Site Language ADMINISTRATION View Application Values Edit Users Privacy Policy Security Statement © 2010	Hello Admin User Welcome to Altoro Mutual Online. View Account Details: GO O Altoro Mutual, Inc.				

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SQL Injection

Little Bobby Tables



Courtesy of XKCD – 34 wed http://xkcd.com/327/

SQL Injection

- Attack Vectors
 - Unauthorized Data Access
 - Unauthorized Data Modification
 - Database Destruction
 - OS Command Execution
 - Yee Haw!



SQL Injection
 Defenses
 Best
 SQL Prepared Statements
 Placeholder Substitution Markers
 User Input is Strongly Typed.

SQL Injection

- Defenses
 - Next Best
 - Escape Data. If possible, escape data before it is sent to the database query engine.
 - Escaping is bad for the Irish.
 - O'Malley -> OMalley

Input Validation

Same as Cross-Site Scripting.

- SQL Injection
 - Defenses
 - Enforce least privilege when connecting to databases and other backend systems.
 - Avoid detailed error messages that are useful to an attacker.
 - Stored procedures can also be injected.

Vulnerabilities - Malicious File Execution GIFAR - Code Smuggling

- >Uploaded User Generated Content
- Billy Rios/Nathan McFeters at BlackHat
- GIF Image file combined with Java Archive file (JAR) = GIFAR
- GIF stores ident/control at front of file
- >JAR (ZIP) stores ident/control at end of file

Top Web Application Attacks Top Web Application Attacks 2008/2009 2008

http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/20

>2009 http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/20

Checkpoint



Web Application Vulnerabilities



OWASP

- No Silver Bullet
- Security & Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)
- Static Source Scanning
- > Dynamic Scanning
- Vulnerability Tracking
- Developer Training & Awareness





Resources
 Hardware
 Software
 Human

Hard Work
 You will see results





Security & Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)

Security Tasks in the SDLC

Developer Training for Security Tasks in the SDLC

Less than 10% (empirical evidence)



SDLC - Security Tasks

- Planning
 - Security Task Durations
 - Plan to address outstanding security issues

Requirements
Reference Security F

- Reference Security Policy
- Authentication
- Cryptography
- Protect Sensitive Data in transit
- Protect Sensitive Data at rest

- SDLC Security Tasks
 - Design
 - Security Reviews Design Documents
 - Development
 Static Scanning Developer, Build, Ad-Hoc
 - QA/UAT
 - Dynamic Scanning Manual and Automated

Implementation/Deployment/Operational
 System Object Security



- Developer vs Build vs Ad Hoc Scans
- Issue Management Strategy
- Hard part is Enterprise Implementation



Static Source Scanning

Issue Management Strategy
 Turn on all checkers

Initial Scan = 50K+ Issues


Fix top Critical and High

Defer all others until next version

No new issues during development

Static Source Scanning

Fortify 360 Demo



HelloWorldJava1.java, line 21 (Poor Logging Practice: Use of a System Output Stream)

Fortify Priority:	Low	Folder	Low
Kingdom:	Encapsulation		
Abstract:	Using System.out or System.err rather than a dedicated logging facility makes it difficult to monitor the behavior of the program.		
Sink:	HelloWorldJava1.java:21 FunctionCall: println()		
19	int intVar;		
20			
21	<pre>System.out.println("Hello World Java 1");</pre>		
22	<pre>System.out.println();</pre>		
23	System.out.println("Argu	ment 1 = " + arg	s[0]);

> Dynamic Scanning

- Manual
 - Intercepting Proxy Burp
- Automated
 IBM Rational AppScan
 Skipfish New, Google
 404 Generator

Give a man an audit and he will be secure for a day. Teach a man to audit and he will be secure for the rest of his life." David Rhoades (SANS)

> Dynamic Scanning

Automated - IBM Rational AppScan

🤣 demo.testfire.net.scan - IBM Rational AppScan _ 0 File Edit View Scan Tools Help 💿 Scan 👻 🔟 Pause 🐻 Manual Explore 🔘 Malware Test 🛛 💥 Scan Configuration 🙎 Scan Expert 👻 III Scan Log 🔎 🛛 🕅 Report 💩 Update Arranged By: Severity Descending 🔒 94 Security Issues (481 variants) for 'My Application' Image: Url Based Blind SQL Injection (2) 😭 My Application (94) 🖃 📷 Cross-Site Scripting (7) 😑 📢 http://demo.testfire.net/ (94) 7 / (6) Image: The second sector is a second seco 藰 comment.aspx (4) Image: The second sector is a second second second second sector (2) Image: Image: The second sec 藰 default.aspx [1] Image: 🖄 disclaimer.htm (2) million in the state of the 藰 feedback.aspx (1) txtSearch 藰 search.aspx (2) http://demo.testfire.net/subscribe.aspx (1) servererror.aspx Database Error Pattern Found (10) subscribe.aspx (7) subscribe.swf 🖣 Previous Next 🕨 Severity 🕶 🕒 High 🛛 State 🕶 Open survey_questions.aspx 🗄 🫅 admin (7) 🔒 Issue Information 🛛 💓 Advisory 🛛 🤡 Fix Recommendation 📌 Request/Response 🛓 🫅 bank (63) 🦁 Show in Browser 🖂 Report False Positive 🐚 Manual Test 🗙 Delete Variant 🥝 Set as Non-vulnerable 🛛 👌 Set as Error Page 🔒 Create Issue Information 😟 🧰 images (1) 😐 🧰 pr Test Original ab > 🚟 Enter phrase. 1 of 22 🔻 🕨 0 × -Variant: 🚽 GET /search.aspx?txtSearch=1234<script>alert(17133)</script> HTTP/1.0 🚰 Variant Details 📧 Screenshot Cookie: lang=; amCreditOffer=CardType=Gold&Limit=10000&Interest=7.9; amUserInfo=UserName=anNtaXRo&Password=RGVtbzEyMzQ=; ASP.NET_SessionId =o5dkksjtd11etjmfckkptbb0; amSessionId=7283763364; amUserId=100116014 ID: 6348 Accept: */* Description: Set parameter value Accept-Language: en-US to: <script>alert(__VAR_ID__) User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Win32) </script> ▼ Dashboard 🛤 🛏 := Host: demo.testfire.net Referer: http://demo.testfire.net/ Difference: **Issue Severity Gauge** The following changes were applied to the original request: Total number of issues: 94 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Injected '1234< script> alert Content-Length: 7266 [17133]</script>' into parameter Connection: close 'txtSearch's value Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2009 12:28:56 GMT Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 Reasoning: The test successfully embedded a X-Powered-By: ASP NET script in the response, and it will be X-AspNet-Version: 2.0.50727 executed once the page is loaded Cache-Control: private Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Enter additional comments for this variant. ÷ DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "_////3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w/3.org/TR//html1/DTD//html1.transitional.dtd"; Visited URLs 98/98 Completed Tests 18274/18274 🔒 94 Security Issues 🔛 🕒 38 🛛 22 📣 20 ii 14

Vulnerability Tracking

- Open Source Vulnerability Database http://osvdb.org/
- NIST National Vulnerability Data

http://nvd.nist.gov/

- Secunia
 - http://secunia.com/advisories/search/
- IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force http://xforce.iss.net/
- Symantec Deep Sight Threat Management
 https://tms.symantec.com/Default.aspx

>Vulnerability Tracking

NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

National Cyber-Alert System

Vulnerability Summary for CVE-2009-2902

Original release date: 01/28/2010

Last revised: 04/01/2010

Source: US-CERT/NIST

Overview

Directory traversal vulnerability in Apache Tomcat 5.5.0 through 5.5.28 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.20 allows remote attackers to delete work-directory files via directory traversal sequences in a WAR filename, as demonstrated by the ...war filename.

Impact

CVSS Severity (version 2.0):

CVSS v2 Base Score: 4.3 (MEDIUM) (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N) (legend)

Impact Subscore: 2.9

Exploitability Subscore: 8.6

<u>CVSS Version 2 Metrics:</u> Access Vector: Network exploitable; Victim must voluntarily interact with attack mechanism

Access Complexity: Medium

Authentication: Not required to exploit

Impact Type: Allows unauthorized modification



SANS/Mitre top 25 Security Errors report http://www.sans.org/top25-programming-error

CERT Secure Coding https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence

Google Browser Security Handbook - Part 1 http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part1

Google Browser Security Handbook - Part 2 http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part2

>Training & Awareness

- Create Training & Awareness Courses
 - Present to Developers and Architects
 - In person
 - Content
 - What Security Engineering/Assurance does
 - Regulatory
 - Web Application
 - Defensive Coding
 - Etc.

Infrastructure

- System Object Security
 File Access
 J2EE Container Security
- Web Application Firewalls
 - Quick and Easy = 1 week purchase to deployment
 - Need to tune for each Web Application
 - Nice defense in depth posture
 - PCI Approved

Checkpoint



Web Application Vulnerabilities

> Remediation Techniques

> > OWASP



> Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) - http://

- www.owasp.org
 - Description
 - Projects
 Guides Development/Testing

Tools – WebScarab

Education – WebGoat

Awareness - Top Ten

OWASP

Description

- The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software.
- Make application security "visible"
- All materials and software are open source.



OWASP

Projects

- Guides Development
 - Architects, developers, consultants and auditors
 - Comprehensive manual for designing, developing and deploying secure web applications.





Projects

 Guides - Testing
 "Best Practices" penetration testing framework

URL: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV



OWASP

Projects

- Tools WebScarab
 - Framework for analyzing applications that communicate using HTTP and HTTPS protocols.
 - Includes intercepting proxy, spider, fuzzer, etc. Written in Java, portable to many platforms.

URL: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV



Projects

Education - WebGoat

Deliberately insecure J2EE web application maintained by OWASP

Web Application security lessons

URL: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV

OWASP

Projects

Awareness - Top Ten (2007 & 2010)
 Powerful awareness document

Broad consensus about most critical web application security flaws

Project members include a variety of security experts from around the world

h ttp://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007



Don't trust the client

Scary and Dangerous Out There

No Silver Bullet, Hard Work

Question and Answers





Main

http://www.owasp.org

- Top Ten
 - **>** h

ttp://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007

Cross-Site Scripting

http:// www.owasp.org/index.php/Data_Validation http://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS %28Crd

OWASP

- Output Encoding
 - http://www.owasp.org/index.php/How_to_perf
- SQL Injection
 - >http://
 - www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection
- > WebGoat
 - **>**URL:
 - http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV

Phoenix Tools

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Phoenix/Too

OWASP

- Development Guide
 - http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV
- Testing Guide
 - >URL:

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV

- WebScarab
 - >URL:

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OV



Main

 http://www.sans.org

 SANS Report – September 2009

 http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/

AltoroMutual Test Site
 http://demo.testfire.net

RSnake XSS Cheatsheet http://ha.ckers.org/xss.html

XKCD

XKCD – http://xkcd.com/327/

GIFAR

- Billy Rios
 - http://xs-sniper.com/blog/2008/12/17/sunfixes-gifars/
- How to create a GIFAR
 - http://riosec.com/how-to-create-a-gifar
- More on GIFARs and Other Java Smuggling http://riosec.com/more-on-gifars-and-other-ja



SQL Attacks By Example

- http://www.unixwiz.net/techtips/sql-injection.html
- Top Web Application Attacks 2008/2009 2008
 - http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com
 2009
 - http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com



Vulnerability Tracking

- Open Source Vulnerability Database http://osvdb.org/
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- Secunia
 - http://secunia.com/advisories/search/
- IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force http://xforce.iss.net/
- Symantec Deep Sight Threat Management
 https://tms.symantec.com/Default.aspx

Thank You!

